Bombay High Court, in a significant judgment dated July 7, 2026, held that an Industrial Tribunal cannot adopt a “hyper-technical” approach to reject approval for the dismissal of an employee found guilty of serious corruption.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sandeep V. Marne observed that minor deficits or statutory deductions in the one-month wages required under the Proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (ID Act) should not result in the reinstatement of a corrupt employee with full backwages. The Court emphasized that such protection is intended to provide “solace,” not to serve as a loophole for escaping the consequences of proved misconduct.
The Petitioner, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), challenged an order of the Industrial Tribunal which had rejected its application for approval to dismiss a clerk, Ravindra M. Pande. The Respondent-employee was found guilty of masterminding a fraud where octroi refund amounts worth over Rs. 4.10 Lakhs were diverted to third-party accounts, with the employee personally receiving Rs. 1.50 Lakhs. While the Tribunal upheld the finding of guilt, it refused to approve the dismissal on the grounds that the Corporation had made minor deductions from his wages and failed to pay an increment, thereby violating the mandatory requirements of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act.
The primary question before the Court was whether the Industrial Tribunal could reject approval for a dismissal action solely on account of an alleged minor deficit in the payment of one month’s wages under the Proviso to Section 33(2)(b). The Court also considered whether statutory deductions or the non-release of a disputed increment would automatically vitiate the compliance required for seeking approval from the Tribunal.
Court Explains Distinction Between Regular Salary And Section 33(2)(b) Wages
The Court observed that the Industrial Tribunal committed a grave error by examining the employee’s pay slip for the month of November 2006 to determine compliance with the law. The Bench clarified that the wages contemplated under the Proviso to Section 33(2)(b) are additional wages of one month, distinct from the normal salary earned by the employee in the month of dismissal.
“The wages contemplated in the Proviso to Section 33(2)(b) is not the normal salary payable in respect of the month in which dismissal/discharge is effected. Proviso to Section 33(2)(b) contemplates payment of additional wages of one month.”
The Court noted that while the Respondent worked until November 30, 2006, and earned his regular salary, the Corporation had separately offered an amount of Rs. 14,468/- towards the additional month’s wages via money order. The Tribunal’s failure to consider this separate payment and its focus on the deductions in the regular salary was termed as a complete misdirection of the legal inquiry.
Tribunal Cannot Ignore Evidence Of Wage Remittance
Justice Marne pointed out that the Corporation had specifically pleaded and produced evidence, including money order receipts, showing that the additional month’s wages were dispatched to the Respondent’s residence. The Court found that the Tribunal had completely ignored this documentary and oral evidence while passing the impugned order.
“The finding of non-payment of wages for one month under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act recorded by the Industrial Tribunal is in ignorance of evidence produced before it of transmitting wage amount… The finding is thus perverse.”
The Court further remarked that once the Petitioner proved the payment of the additional wages, the burden shifted to the Respondent to establish that the amount did not represent full wages. However, the Respondent failed to produce any evidence or specific pleadings to prove that the amount offered via money order was insufficient.
Hyper-Technical Approach On Minor Deficits Disapproved
Addressing the issue of minor deductions, the Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in S. Ganapathy and Ors. vs. Air India and Anr., which held that if a minor deficit is noticed in the paid amount, the Tribunal can direct the employer to deposit the deficit rather than setting aside the dismissal. The High Court observed that a “hyper-technical” approach that results in a corrupt employee walking back into service with full backwages is ridiculous.
“This special protection under Proviso to Section 33(2)(b) cannot be overstretched to such an extent that the same results in a ridiculous situation where the corrupt municipal employee walks back in service with a reward of full backwages.”
Regarding the non-payment of an increment, the Court held that if a dispute exists regarding the employee’s right to draw such an increment at the relevant time, its exclusion does not amount to a violation of Section 33(2)(b). The Court emphasized that the law requires payment of what the workman would have “ordinarily received,” not his contested legal entitlements.
Tribunal’s Refusal To Review On Merits Held Erroneous
The High Court also set aside the Tribunal’s order rejecting the Corporation’s Review Application. While the Tribunal had virtually admitted its mistake in not considering the money order payment, it had refused to correct the error on the ground that it lacked the power to review the order on merits. The High Court found this refusal to be another layer of perversity that allowed a technical loophole to override the findings of grave misconduct.
The High Court concluded that the Respondent was found guilty of a grave misconduct involving forgery and corruption, and the Tribunal had not interfered with that finding of guilt. By focusing on technicalities while ignoring substantial evidence of compliance, the Tribunal had failed to appreciate the purpose of Section 33(2)(b). Consequently, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s orders and granted approval for the Respondent’s removal from service.
